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Does finance follow the real economy, or the other way around? This paper unites the two competing
schools of thought in a general equilibrium framework. Our key result is that there are threshold effects
defined by a set of deep institutional parameters (cost of financial intermediation, quality of corporate
governance, and level of property rights protection) which can be used to separate economies of high-quality
institutions from those of low-quality institutions. On one hand, for economies with high-quality institutions,
the view that finance follows the real economy is essentially correct. Equilibrium output and prices
are determined by factor endowment. Further improvement in the institutions does not affect patterns
of output. On the other hand, for economies with low-quality institutions, the view that finance is a
key driver of the real economy is essentially correct. Not only is finance a source of comparative advantage,
but an increase in capital endowment has no effect on outputs and prices. Our model extends a standard
one-sector, partial equilibrium model of corporate finance to a multi-sector, general equilibrium analysis.
Surprisingly, but consistent with data, we show that the size of financial markets (relative to GDP)
does not change monotonically with either the quality of institutions or with the factor endowment.
Free trade may reduce the aggregate income of an economy with low-quality institutions. Financial




700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
and University of Oklahoma
jju@imf.org
Shang-Jin Wei
Graduate School of Business
Columbia University
Uris Hall, Room 619
3022 Broadway




2T h e M o d e l 7
2 . 1 B a s i cS e t u p................................ 8
2 . 2 E n t r e p r e n e u r ’ sO p t i m i z a t i o nP r o b l e m ................. 1 0
2 . 3 F r e eE n t r yC o n d i t i o n........................... 1 1
3 Institutional Quality and Equilibrium Conditions 13
3.1 Equilibrium Properties with High-quality Institutions . . . . . . . . 13
3.2 What Deﬁn e sH i g h - q u a l i t yI n s t i t u t i o n s ?................ 1 6
3.3 Equilibrium Properties with Low-q u a l i t yI n s t i t u t i o n s......... 1 9
4 Dependence on External Finance and Financial Development 20
4 . 1 F i r m - l e v e lD e p e n d e n c eo nE x t e r n a lF i n a n c e.............. 2 1
4.2 The Relative Size of Financial Markets - A Common Measure of
F i n a n c i a lD e v e l o p m e n t.......................... 2 2
4.2.1 The Size of Financial Market with High-quality Institutions . 24
4.2.2 The Size of Financial Market with Low-quality Institutions . 25
4.2.3 The Size of Financial Market and Production Structure . . . 27
5 Free Trade and Capital Flows 28
5 . 1 F r e eT r a d e ................................. 2 9
5.1.1 Trade Pattern and Relative Size of Financial Market . . . . . 29
5 . 1 . 2 A g g r e g a t eI n c o m e ........................ 3 1
5 . 1 . 3 W e l f a r e .............................. 3 3
5 . 2 C a p i t a lF l o w s............................... 3 4
5 . 2 . 1 F i n a n c i a lC a p i t a lF l o w...................... 3 4
5.2.2 Two-Way Capital Flows and the Bypass Eﬀe c t........ 3 5
6C o n c l u s i o n 3 7
7 Appendix 41
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Dominant theories of international trade tend to ignore the role of ﬁnance as a source
of comparative advantage. For example, ﬁnance is absent in leading graduate level
textbooks by Dixit and Norman (1980), Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinvasan (1998)
and Feenstra (2004), in the recently revived Ricardian model of Eaton and Kortum
(2002) and Alvarez and Lucas (2005), and in a recent resurgence of empirical papers
on determinants of trade structure by Treﬂer (1993 and 1995), Harrigan (1997),
Davis and Weinstein (2001 and 2003), and Romalis (2004). The absence of a
role for ﬁnance in trade theories is in line with an inﬂuential view in economics
generally that ﬁnancial development merely follows on the development of the
real economy. In other words, the observed level of ﬁnancial development is an
endogenous consequence of a country’s factor endowment. This view is shared by
Robinson (1952) and Lucas (1988), among others.
On the other hand, an equally inﬂuential view regards ﬁnancial development as
an independent source of comparative advantage and economic growth. This second
view is promoted by Schumpeter (1912), Goldsmith (1969), and Miller (1998). A
vast empirical literature, mostly in the ﬁeld of ﬁnance, has sought to discover the role
of ﬁnance in determining production structure. Pioneered by Rajan and Zingales
(1998) and followed by Beck and Levine (2002), Carlin and Mayer (2003), Claessens
and Laeven (2003), and Fisman and Love (2004) among others, this body of work
demonstrates that, in countries with developed ﬁnancial systems, those industries
reliant more on external ﬁnance are likely to grow faster relative to other industries.
An economy’s level of ﬁnancial development is typically measured in the empirical
literature by the size of its ﬁnancial market (the ratio of domestic credit to GDP, or
the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP). Perhaps it is not surprising that
ﬁnancial development should similarly reveal itself in trade patterns. Beck (2002
and 2003), Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005), and Manova (2008) report evidence that
2countries with a higher level of ﬁnancial development have a higher export share in
industries that use more external ﬁnance. Manova (2007) further investigates the
eﬀects of credit constraints on the observed zeros in a bilateral trade matrix, the
varieties of exports, and turnover in the product mix of exports over time.
Do and Levchenko (2007) cast doubt on the notion that ﬁnancial development is
a genuinely independent source of comparative advantage, and present a model that
argues for reverse causality: the size of ﬁnancial markets, an empirical measure of
ﬁnancial development, is itself inﬂuenced by comparative advantage and international
trade. Suppose, for reasons unrelated to ﬁnancial development, country A has a
comparative advantage in a sector that uses more external ﬁnance than country
B. As both countries move from autarky towards free trade, country A’s ﬁnancial
market (and the sector that uses more external ﬁnance) should expand while that of
country B shrinks. This will generate the pattern identiﬁed by Rajan and Zingales
(1998), but the direction of causality goes from endowment, to the pattern of growth,
and to the size of ﬁnancial markets (relative to GDP). In order to support this
competing interpretation, Do and Levchenko report evidence taken from a sample
of 96 countries between 1977 and 1999.
In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium theory to unify the two competing
schools of thought. We consider each view only partially correct, not just because
both ﬁnance and the real economy aﬀect each other. Our key result is that there
are threshold eﬀects deﬁned by a set of deep institutional parameters (cost of
ﬁnancial intermediation, quality of corporate governance, and level of property rights
protection). On one hand, for economies with high-quality institutions, the view that
ﬁnance follows the real economy is essentially correct. Equilibrium output and prices
are determined by initial endowments, and ﬁnance is not a source of comparative
advantage. That is, an improvement in the quality of the ﬁnancial system in
such an economy would not alter patterns of production and trade, contrary to
the arguments of Rajan and Zingales (1998). Because of these properties, such
3economies can also be called endowment binding. On the other hand, for economies
with low-quality institutions, the view that ﬁnance is a key driver of the real economy
is essentially correct. Finance is a source of comparative advantage, and factor
endowments may fail to determine equilibrium outputs or prices at the margin.
That is, an infusion of capital into such an economy, holding institutional parameters
constant, would not change equilibrium output and trade patterns. Such economies
may be called institutionally binding. The Rajan-Zingales (1998) interpretation of
the ﬁnance-growth connection works in such economies.
In order to have a meaningful discussion of comparative advantage, we must
consider at least two sectors (something theoretical models in the ﬁnance literature,
do not commonly do with regards to this topic). In order to introduce the relevant
institutional parameters, we incorporate the ﬁnancial contract model of Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997) into the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) framework.
Both production structure and the size of a ﬁnancial market are endogenously
determined by deep institutional parameters and by factor endowment. The precise
deﬁnition of high and low-quality institutions, and the exact threshold that separates
the two types of economy, will be derived and made explicit later in this paper.
Our model implies two wedges between expected marginal returns to capital
and the ﬁnancial interest rates received by ﬁnancial investors: the ﬁrst is the cost
of ﬁnancial intermediation, and the second is agency cost. This suggests that,
due to ineﬃcient ﬁnancial intermediation or to poor corporate governance, the
ﬁnancial interest rate on savings could be low even if an economy were to have
a low capital-to-labor ratio. Indeed, if the quality of these institutions lies below a
certain threshold, the ﬁnancial interest rate will remain at zero, and a portion of the
economy’s capital endowment will be unemployed in equilibrium. Therefore, in this
case, it is the quality of the ﬁnancial system, rather than the capital endowment,
that determines equilibrium prices and output.
Economies with low-quality institutions have a few noteworthy features. First,
4their comparative advantage is determined by institutions, rather than by factor
endowment. An improvement in ﬁnancial intermediation or corporate governance
increases total capital usage in the country, thereby increasing the output of capital
intensive goods while reducing the output of labor intensive goods. This further
raises the total amount of external ﬁnance in the economy. Second, consider an
economy with a lower capital-to-labor ratio than the world average. Going from
autarky to free trade, such an economy exports labor intensive goods and imports
capital intensive goods. As a result, more capital is left unemployed, so that
trade openness reduces aggregate income. Going from ﬁnancial autarky to ﬁnancial
openness, this economy generates capital ﬂows from South to North in a pattern
k n o w na st h eL u c a sp a r a d o x .
An economy with high-quality institutions behaves as a textbook Heckscher-Ohlin
economy. In particular, standard results such as the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
and the Rybczynski theorem all hold. We provide additional comparative statics by
varying deep institutional parameters. For example, we show that a reduction in
the cost of ﬁnancial intermediation would not aﬀect production and trade patterns.
Our paper makes another contribution to the literature. We distinguish the deep
institutional parameters (i.e. cost of ﬁnancial intermediation, quality of corporate
governance, and protection of property rights) that are important to determine the
relative size of a ﬁnancial market, from the relative size of the ﬁnancial market
itself. We derive the latter to be a function of the former, and show that the two
do not always have a monotonic relationship, but instead depend crucially on the
quality of economic institutions. Rajan and Zingales (1998) popularized the notion
of intrinsic demands, by sector, for external ﬁnance. In this model, we derive the
demand for external ﬁnance as a function of deep institutional parameters. Across
sectors, diﬀerences in the use of external ﬁnance come primarily from diﬀerences in
the ﬁxed costs a capitalist must pay to become an entrepreneur. Across countries,
diﬀerences in the use of external ﬁnance even in the same sector depend most heavily
5on the quality of corporate governance.
For economies with high-quality institutions, we show that improved ﬁnancial
systems increase the relative size of ﬁnancial markets, while increased capital endowments
reduce ﬁnancial interest rates, depress the incentive for capitalists to become ﬁnancial
investors, and thereby reduce the relative size of ﬁnancial markets. We also show
that the eﬀect of an improvement in the quality of ﬁnancial systems on the relative
size of ﬁnancial markets may not be monotonic. For economies with high-quality
institutions, improvements in the quality of ﬁnancial systems increase the total
amount of external ﬁnance more than they increase GDP. Therefore, such improvements
raise the relative size of the ﬁnancial market. For economies with low-quality
ﬁnancial institutions, however, the same improvements lead to smaller increases in
total amounts of external ﬁnance as a fraction of GDP. Such improvements therefore
reduce the relative size of ﬁnancial markets in economies with low-quality ﬁnancial
institutions. Our theory provides an explanation for the empirical ﬁnding reported
by Rajan and Zingales (2003), that ﬁnancial markets did not grow in step with
income in many countries, but instead experienced what they call “great reversals”
over the past century. Our theoretical results are consistent with the empirical
ﬁnding of La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998) that investor protection is important for
determining the relative size of ﬁnancial markets.
Our paper is related to a small but growing theoretical literature that models the
role of ﬁnancial systems in determining patterns of production and trade. Kletzer
and Bardhan (1987), Baldwin (1989), Beck (2002), Matsuyama (2005), and Wynne
(2005) show that countries with a relatively well-developed ﬁnancial systems have a
comparative advantage in industries that are reliant on external ﬁnance. Two recent
papers are particularly interesting to us. While our model discusses the role of the
ﬁnancial system in an otherwise classical HOS form, Antras and Caballero (2007)
study the eﬀect of credit constraints on international trade and capital ﬂows using
as p e c i ﬁc-factor model form, and show that in less ﬁnancially developed economies,
6trade and capital mobility are complements. Manova (2007) introduces credit
constraints to a monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous ﬁrms. None
of these papers studies threshold eﬀects in economies with high-quality institutions
versus low-quality institutions. Ju and Wei (2005) provide the ﬁrst paper to discuss
threshold eﬀects in ﬁnancial development. Except for that of Do and Levchenko
(2007), all these papers treat ﬁnancial development as exogenous. Our paper is
also related to a body of literature on international trade and institutional quality.
See Levchenko (2007), and Costinot (2005) for applications of a transaction cost
approach, and Antras (2003), Antras and Helpman (2004), and Nunn (2007) for
applications of a property rights approach.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the setup of our
model and discusses the microfoundation of internal and external ﬁnance. Section
3 studies equilibrium properties, with attention to diﬀerences between economies
with high-quality institutions or low-quality institutions. Section 4 discusses the
endogenous determination of both ﬁrm-level demand for external ﬁnance and country-level
size of ﬁnancial market. Section 5 studies the consequences of free trade and
capital ﬂows. Section 6 concludes. An Appendix collects formal proofs of various
propositions introduced in the text.
2 The Model
In an otherwise standard HOS framework of two goods, two factors, and two countries,
we introduce a ﬁnancial contract between entrepreneur and investors. There is
a large literature on agency models in corporate ﬁnance in which a contracting
problem is solved to implement a ﬁrm’s second-best demand for external ﬁnance
(see Diamond 1991, Berglof and von Thadden 1994, Hart and Moore 1998, and
Holmstrom and Tirole 1997). We modify the setup in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)
from a one-good, one-factor model to a two-goods, two-factors model.
72.1 Basic Setup
We start with a closed economy with two factors, labor and capital, and two sectors
i =1 ,2. The production function for ﬁrms in industry i has constant return to scale
and is denoted by yi = Fi(li,k i). The labor-capital ratio, li/ki, is assumed to be
ﬁxed and denoted by ai. The real wage rate and the real ﬁnancial interest rate are
represented by w and r, respectively. Let pi be the price of good i. Good 2 is taken
as the numeraire whose price is normalized to be 1. Without loss of generality, we
assume that good 1 is labor intensive, and good 2 is capital intensive.
The model features ﬁnancial investors, entrepreneurs and (passive) ﬁnancial
intermediation. The timing of events is described in Figure 1. K denotes both
the number of capitalists and the amount of capital in the economy. Each capitalist
i sa s s u m e dt ob eb o r nw i t h1 unit of capital and faces an endogenous choice, at
the beginning of the ﬁrst period, of becoming either an entrepreneur or a ﬁnancial
investor. If she chooses to be an entrepreneur, she would manage a project, investing
her 1 unit of capital (labeled as internal capital) and raising kX
i amount of external
capital from ﬁnancial investors through the ﬁnancial system. The total investment in
the ﬁrm is the sum of internal and external capital, or ki =1+kX
i . Correspondingly,
aiki amount of labor is hired.1
After the investment decision is made in the ﬁrst period, production and consumption
take place in the second period. The return to one unit of capital if the project
succeeds, Ri, is deﬁned by the ﬁrm’s zero proﬁt condition
piyi − wli =[ piFi(ai,1) − wai]ki = Riki (1)
We use a framework of moral hazard that is derived and simpliﬁed from Holmstrom
and Tirole (HT for short, 1997) to parameterize the quality of corporate governance.
1Each variable in principle should have separate ﬁrm and sector subscripts. Since all ﬁrms
within a sector are identical, we abuse the notation a bit by using a single subscript to denote a
typical ﬁrm in sector i.
8More precisely, entrepreneurs, whose own capital endowment is insuﬃcient for the
ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial needs, obtain external ﬁnancing from ﬁnancial investors. We extend
the HT (1997) setup in two ways. First, the marginal return to capital, Ri, is
endogenously determined (whereas it is exogenous in the HT setup). Second, capitalists
make an endogenous career choice between being ﬁnancial investors or entrepreneurs
(whereas this choice is also exogenous in HT (1997)).
For a representative ﬁrm, the ﬁnal output depends in part on the entrepreneur’s
l e v e lo fe ﬀort, which can be low or high, but is not observable by the ﬁnancial
investors or by the ﬁnancial institution. The entrepreneur can choose among two
versions of the project. The “Good” version has a high probability of success, λH,
while oﬀe r i n gn op r i v a t eb e n e ﬁt. The “Bad” version has a low probability of project
success, λL, but oﬀering a private beneﬁt per unit of capital managed, b, to the









− (1 + r)+b, so that only
the “Good” version is implemented. For simplicity, the probability of success and
private beneﬁt are assumed to be identical across all entrepreneurs. In subsequent
discussions, we normalize λL =0and let λH = λ. The total expected return per
unit of capital in this two-period model is equal to
1+λRi =1+λ[piFi(ai,1) − wai] (2)
The quality of a ﬁnancial system, depicted in Figure 2, is summarized by two
parameters: the cost of ﬁnancial intermediation, c, and the agency cost (private
beneﬁt), b. Investors collectively put kX
i amount of external capital into a ﬁrm
through ﬁnancial intermediation. In equilibrium, while the total return per unit of
capital is 1+λRi, an entrepreneur receives a payment of λRE
i per unit of capital
managed. The entrepreneur then pays 1+λRi − λRE
i per unit of capital to the
ﬁnancial intermediaries, who retain c as the cost of intermediation, and pass on
91+λRi − λRE
i − c per unit of capital to the ﬁnancial investors.
The equilibrium internal and external ﬁnance in the economy is determined by
two parts: (a) a representative entrepreneur’s optimization problem, and (b) a free
entry condition that governs the division of the capitalists into the entrepreneurs’
and ﬁnancial investors’ groups. We discuss the two parts sequentially.
2.2 Entrepreneur’s Optimization Problem
The entrepreneur chooses the amount of external capital kX
i , her own capital contribution
to the project kN
i , the total investment in the project ki, and the marginal payment
to the entrepreneur’s eﬀort RE























ki ≥ (1 + r)kX
i (6)
λRE
i ≥ b (7)
The objective function (3) represents the entrepreneur’s expected income. The
ﬁrst term represents the entrepreneur’s share in total capital revenue. The second
term is the gross return from investing her own 1−kN
i capital in the market. Turning
to the constraints, inequality (4) speciﬁes that entrepreneur’s internal capital is
lass than or equal to her capital endowment. Inequality (5) requires that total
investment does not exceed the sum of internal and external capital. Inequality (6)
is the participation constraint for outside ﬁnancial investors, while inequality (7) is
the entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility constraint.
10It is straightforward to show that all constraints must be binding in equilibrium.
The entrepreneur will invest all her endowment kN
i =1in the ﬁrm. The total
investment ki equals the sum of internal and external capital, kX
i +1. The incentive






The investors’ participation constraint (6) is binding. Substituting (8) into (6) gives
the ﬁrm’s optimal investment2
ki =
1+r
(r + c)+b − λRi
(9)
Therefore, the ﬁrm’s dependence on external ﬁnance, measured by the ratio of





1+λRi − c − b
1+r
(10)
Substituting (8) and (9) into (3), the entrepreneur’s expected income becomes
Ui = kib =
(1 + r)b
(r + c)+b − λRi
(11)
2.3 Free Entry Condition
We assume that a capitalist (a potential entrepreneur) needs to pay a ﬁxed entry
cost of fi in units of numeraire goods to become an entrepreneur in sector i.3 With
free entry and exit, a capitalist is indiﬀerent between becoming an entrepreneur or
2Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we rule out the case that (1 + r + c)+bi − λRi < 0
in which the ﬁrm would want to invest without limit.
3For expositional convenience, we assume that neither the entry cost for becoming an
entrepreneur, nor the cost of ﬁnancial intermediation, reduces the amount of capital that can
be employed in the ﬁr s tp e r i o d . B o t hc o s t sh a v et ob ep a i du pi nt h es e c o n dp e r i o d ,b u tt h e i r
present values in the ﬁrst period are fi and c, respectively. For example, the entrepreneur’s entry
cost speciﬁes that the payment in the second period is equal to
fi(1+r)
λ if the project succeeds and
zero otherwise, so that the expected present value in the ﬁrst period is exactly fi.
11a ﬁnancial investor in equilibrium. A ﬁnancial investor’s expected return per unit
of capital is 1+r. Thus, an entrepreneur’s expected income net of the entry cost,
Ui − (1 + r)fi, should be equal to (1 + r). That is,
Ui − (1 + r)fi =1+r (12)
Using (11), the free entry condition (12) implies that




By combining equations (11) and (12), the last term in (13),
fib
1+fi,c a nb ee a s i l y
shown to be equal to [Ui − (1 + r)]/ki = fi(1+r)/ki, or the entrepreneur’s expected
return net of the opportunity cost of her own endowment per unit of capital invested.
We therefore refer to the last term as the average net pay to the entrepreneur,
denoted by b
avg







Equation (13) is an important relationship and will be referred to later as a
capital revenue sharing rule (CRSR). It states that the expected marginal product
of physical capital is the sum of three terms: the ﬁnancial interest rate paid to the
ﬁnancial investors, (1+r), the cost of ﬁnancial intermediation, c, and the average
n e tp a yt ot h ee n t r e p r e n e u r , b
avg
i . Following the literature, we assume that the ﬁxed
entry cost in the capital intensive sector is larger than that in the labor intensive





When c = b =0 , the marginal return to physical capital and the ﬁnancial
interest rate coincide. On the other hand, ineﬃciencies in the ﬁnancial system
due to either a high cost of ﬁnancial intermediation, or a high level of corporate
agency cost, drive a wedge between the two. The poorer the quality of corporate
4Antras and Caballero (2007) make a similar assumption. Manova (2006) reports a positive
cross-sectoral correlation between capital intensity and the dependence on external ﬁnance.
12governance (represented by a higher value of b), or the lower the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial
intermediation (represented by a higher value of c), the lower the ﬁnancial interest
rate for a given level of marginal return to physical capital.
3 Institutional Quality and Equilibrium Conditions
We now examine how the nature of the economic equilibrium depends on the three
deep institutional parameters, c, b, and λ, and factor endowment. We start with an
economy with high-quality institutions. That is, relative to factor endowment, the
cost of intermediation, c, and the agency cost, b, are suﬃciently low, and the level of
property rights protection, λ, is suﬃciently high. While many standard results such
as the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the Rybczynski theorem hold, we emphasize
some comparative statics results involving the deep institutional parameters that
have not been explored in the literature.
The second part of the section will then discuss equilibrium properties of an
economy with low-quality institutions, that is, when c or b is high, or λ is low,
relative to factor endowment. Standard results such as the Rybczynski theorem no
longer hold. A change in endowment does not aﬀect the equilibrium output. Indeed,
it is possible for some of the capital endowment to be unemployed in equilibrium.
3.1 Equilibrium Properties with High-quality Institutions
We start with the case of an economy with high-quality institutions. The exact
thresholds on c, b,a n dλ will be made precise in the next subsection. The ﬁrst set
of equilibrium conditions are free entry conditions. Using (2) and rewriting CRSR
(13) in two sectors, we have:
g + λa1w = λpF1(a1,1) − b
avg
1 (15)
g + λa2w = λF2(a2,1) − b
avg
2 (16)
13where g = r + c is the gross interest rate. Equations (15) and (16) resemble the
zero proﬁt conditions in a Heckscher-Ohlin model. For given institutional variables
λ and b
avg
i , it is immediately seen that factor prices (w,g) are uniquely determined
by product prices (p,1). The standard Stolper-Samuelson theorem holds here. That
is, an increase in the price of a good will increase the return to the factor used more
intensively in producing that good, and reduce the return to the other factor.
Let L and K be the country’s labor and capital endowments, respectively. Let
the number of ﬁrms in sector i be Ni. The expected output in sector i,
Yi = Niyi = λFi(ai,1)Ki,
where Ki = Niki is the amount of capital used in sector i. Let zi = Yi/L, and
κ = K/L be the output and capital endowment per capita, respectively. The factor
endowment constraints can therefore be written as
a1Lz1 + a2Lz2 =1 (17)









are labor and capital usages to produce one unit of output in sector i.
The labor constraint (17) and the capital constraint (18) jointly determine
the equilibrium output per capita (z1,z 2). As can be veriﬁed, an increase in the
capital-labor ratio would increase the output of the capital intensive sector, but
would decrease the output of the labor intensive sector. This is a result familiar to
trade economists, known as the Rybczynski Theorem.
The third equilibrium condition requires that the product market clears. We
assume that the representative consumer’s preference is homothetic. The ratio of
14the quantities consumed, D(p), depends only upon the relative product price. To




The ﬁve endogenous variables, w,r,z1,z 2, and p are determined by ﬁve equations,
(15), (16), (17), (18) and (20). As in a standard HOS model, under an assumption
of a ﬁxed labor-capital ratio, ai, the equilibrium conditions are simpliﬁed into a
block-recursive system. Outputs per capita (z1,z 2) are determined by endowment
(1,κ) through equations (17) and (18). The relative price p is then determined by
(z1,z 2) through (20). Given p, factor prices (w,g) c a nb es o l v e db ye q u a t i o n s( 1 5 )
and (16). Because the labor-capital ratio ai is assumed ﬁxed, this analysis produces
direct eﬀects.5 By combining the Rybczynski and the Stolper-Samuelson theorems,
w ec a ne a s i l ys h o wt h a tr declines as κ increases.
We now study the consequences of an improvement in the quality of ﬁnancial
institutions on the equilibrium output and prices. Because the equilibrium conditions
have a block-recursive structure, such an improvement (a reduction in c,o ra
reduction in b)a ﬀects only factor prices through (15) and (16), but not the equilibrium
output and product prices. There is some small diﬀerence between a reduction in c
and a reduction in b. Since the gross interest rate g is determined by equations (15)
and (16) and c appears only through g, a decrease in c must increase the ﬁnancial
interest rate by the same amount (dr = −dc), but has no eﬀect on the wage rate.
On the other hand, a reduction in b increases g (therefore r) but decreases w.
Strengthening property rights protection (an increase in λ) changes both factor
prices and outputs. By inspecting equations (17) and (18), we see that a larger λ
raises output in both sectors (y1,y 2) proportionally, while maintaining the relative
5If ai is recognized to depend on factor prices, there are additional feedback eﬀects. However,
as it has been proven by Jones (1965), as long as some stability conditions hold, there would be no
qualitative diﬀerence in the comparative statics if the feedback eﬀects are ignored.
15price p unchanged. Using equations (15) and (16) again, we can show that an
increase in λ reduces the wage rate w, but raises the ﬁnancial interest rate r.
Note that similar to Stopler-Samuelson theorem, a reduction in b, or an increase
in λ results in a conﬂict of interests between capital owners and labor owners. We
summarize the discussion by the following proposition and relegate a formal proof
to the Appendix.
Proposition 1 With high-quality institutions, the following comparative statics hold.
(1) Both the Stopler-Samuelson theorem and the Rybczynski theorem hold. (2) An
improvement in the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial intermediation (a lower c), quality of
corporate governance (a lower b), or property rights protection (a higher λ)w o u l d
raise the equilibrium level of ﬁnancial interest rate. (3) While an improvement in the
eﬃciency of ﬁnancial intermediation has no eﬀe c to nt h ew a g er a t e ,a ni m p r o v e m e n t
in either corporate governance or property rights protection would reduce the wage
rate. (4) An improvement in any of three institutional parameters has no eﬀect on
the equilibrium relative output and relative prices.
In other words, with high-quality institutions, the comparative advantage of
an economy is fully determined by its factor endowment. An increase in capital
endowment increases the output of the capital intensive good, but decreases the
output of the labor intensive good. In comparison, an improvement in the eﬃciency
of ﬁnancial intermediation or corporate governance, while raising the ﬁnancial interest
rate, has no eﬀect on the production pattern. Because of these features, an economy
with high-quality institutions is also referred to as an endowment-binding economy.
3.2 What Deﬁnes High-quality Institutions?
We now come to the task of deﬁning the threshold values of the institutions that
separate high-quality institutions from low-quality institutions. Holding factor endowment
constant, since the level of the ﬁnancial interest rate is aﬀected by the three institutional
16parameters, c, b, and λ, the maximum amount of capital employed in an economy
is determined by them as well.







where D−1(.) is the inverse function of demand. Applying (21) into equations (15)























g = c + r is a decreasing function of capital per capita, κ, the agency cost b
and the level of property rights protection λ. We denote it as g = I(κ,b,λ). Its
inverse, κ(g)=I−1(g,b,λ), gives the maximum amount of capital per capita that
an economy employs at any given level of gross interest rate g.
The gross interest rate cannot be lower than the cost of intermediation c, since
otherwise the ﬁnancial interest rate r would have to be negative.6 Letting g = c


















Equation (23) gives the maximum amount of capital employed per capita, κmax, as a





db < 0, and
dκmax(c,b,λ)
dλ > 0. That is, a reduction
in the cost of intermediation, a reduction in the agency cost, or a strengthening of
6The real (ﬁnancial) interest rate could be negative in the real world due to inﬂation. However,
there is still a minimum real interest rate (a ﬂoor) below which households would not want to put
their savings in the formal ﬁnancial system. As long as this is the case, the qualitative results of
our discussion carry through.
17property rights protection increases the employment of capital in the economy.
If κ>κ max(c,b,λ), (κ − κmax(c,b,λ))L number of investors exit from the ﬁnancial
system. Financial investors are indiﬀerent between investing and not investing.
Given any two parameters among c,b, and λ, equation (23) deﬁnes a threshold curve
to determine whether an economy has high-quality institutions (endowment-binding)
or low-quality institutions (institutionally binding). For example, given b = b0 and
λ = λ0, equation (23) deﬁnes a threshold curve in (κ,c) space, depicted in Figure
3a scκ curve. The capital endowment per capita κ and intermediation cost c are
represented in horizontal and vertical axes, respectively. For all points to the left
side of the curve, all capital endowment is in full usage, and all values of c (relative
t oap a r t i c u l a rκ) correspond to high-quality institutions. For example, at point
D =( κ0,c) where κ0 <κ max(c,b0,λ 0), the gross interest rate g0 = I(κ0) >cso that all
capital in the country is employed. The points to the right side of cκ curve, however,
deﬁne low-quality institutions. At point B =( κ00,c) where κ00 >κ max(c,b0,λ 0),
the gross interest rate is stuck at c and the ﬁnancial interest rate r =0 . Since
¡
κ00 − κmax(c,b0,λ 0)
¢
L amount of capital is unemployed, the capital endowment is
no longer binding. Instead, the cost of ﬁnancial intermediation, c, now determines
the equilibrium output and prices. Relative to a particular value of κ,t h e s ev a l u e s
of c’s are too high.
Of course, we can also hold c and λ constant, and vary b, or hold c and b constant,
and vary λ. In general, a four-dimensional space of thresholds, (κmax,c,b,λ),g i v e n
by equation (23), separates high-quality from low-quality institutions.
183.3 Equilibrium Properties with Low-quality Institutions
For an economy with low-quality institutions, the capital revenue sharing rule in
two sectors (15) and (16) can be written as








Two striking results in such an economy are that prices are stuck and that there is
unemployed capital. Given that the gross interest rate g = c, the capital revenue
sharing rule for good 2, equation (25), solves for the wage rate w. Given the gross
interest rate c and the wage rate w,t h ecapital revenue sharing rule for good 1,
equation (24), solves for the product price p.
As long as the institutional parameters (c,b,λ) do not change, both factor and
product prices are stuck. Changes in market demand and supply do not aﬀect
product prices; instead, the reverse is true. Institutional parameters determine
product price p; product market clearing condition (20) then solves for relative
output z1/z2. Given z1/z2, factor market clearing conditions (17) and (18) determine
the amount of employed capital in the economy, Kmax(c,b,λ)=κmax(c,b,λ)L.
To summarize, a country’s use of capital is bound by κmax(c,b,λ). When the
capital-labor ratio is less than κmax(c,b,λ), the country behaves as a textbook
version of a neoclassical economy. When capital endowment is abundant in the sense
that κ>κ max(c,b,λ), however, the capital usage is stuck at κmax(c,b,λ). Beyond
that level, the ﬁnancial interest rate becomes zero, and investors lose incentives to
supply capital. Any infusion of additional capital from abroad, for example, through
the World Bank, the IMF, or rich country governments, is not productive in such
an economy. An improvement in ﬁnancial system, however, can alter equilibrium
output and prices.
To see the comparative statics, let us focus on cases in which the economy is
19still institutionally binding after the changes. It is easy to see that an increase in c
has no eﬀect on net interest rate r since r = g − c =0 . Using (25), an increase in c
reduces the wage rate w. Substituting (25) into (24), we can show that the relative
price of labor intensive good p decreases, which raises the labor intensive output
z1 but reduces the capital intensive output z2. Total investment in the economy,
κmax(c,b,λ), decreases as c increases. An increase in b has the same eﬀect as an
increase in c.
The eﬀect of a deterioration in the property rights protection (a decrease in
λ) reduces the wage rate. Its eﬀect on output is more complicated. Through
factor constraints (17) and (18), it reduces the expected output in the two sectors
proportionally. On the other hand, it also reduces the relative price p through
equations (24) and (25), which increases z1, but reduces z2. T h u s ,t h eo v e r a l le ﬀect
of a worsening of the property rights protection is to reduce the capital intensive
output, while the eﬀect on the labor intensive output is ambiguous. We summarize
these results below and relegate a formal proof to the Appendix.
Proposition 2 In an economy with low-quality of institutions, the comparative
advantage is determined by the three institutional parameters, rather than by the
factor endowment. An increase in capital endowment has no eﬀect on the economy.
A reduction in the cost of ﬁnancial intermediation or the agency cost, on the other
hand, increases the wage rate and total capital usage in the country, thereby increasing
the output of capital intensive good but reducing the output of labor intensive good.
4 Dependence on External Finance and Financial Development
The empirical literature reports that the level of dependence on external ﬁnance
varies dramatically across diﬀerent industries. Rajan and Zingales (1998) deﬁne
external ﬁnance as the amount of desired investment that cannot be ﬁnanced through
internal cash ﬂows generated by the same business. Using data from the United
20States, they measure a ﬁrm’s dependence on external ﬁnance by capital expenditures
minus cash ﬂow from operations divided by capital expenditures. An economy’s
ﬁnancial development, on the other hand, is commonly measured by the size of
ﬁnancial market (the ratio of domestic bank credit to GDP, or that plus the ratio
of stock market capitalization to GDP) in the empirical literature. To evaluate the
appropriateness of these measures, we now derive their counterparts in our model.
4.1 Firm-level Dependence on External Finance
Since allowing b1 6= b2 does not change any results in Section 2, we therefore let
private beneﬁts diﬀer across sectors in this subsection. Substituting CRSR (13)





Expression (26) gives the equilibrium level of a ﬁrm’s use of external ﬁnance,
which increases in r and fi but decreases in bi. Here we oﬀer some intuition. First,
when the ﬁnancial interest rate r increases, more capitalists choose to become
ﬁnancial investors. The economy-wide ratio of external capital (from ﬁnancial
investors) to internal capital (from entrepreneurs) increases, and the external dependence
φi increases in every sector. Second, when the ﬁxed cost in sector i, fi, increases,
fewer entrepreneurs enter sector i so that fewer ﬁrms are producing. The product
price and therefore the expected marginal value product of capital in sector i, λRi,
increase. As a result, ﬁrms in sector i can raise more funding from outside investors.
Lastly, the marginal pay to the entrepreneur is equal to the private beneﬁti n
equilibrium. If it is lower, the pay to outside investors in sector i, λRi−bi, is higher,
which results in more external investment in the project and therefore higher usage
of external ﬁnance. Summarizing we have:
Proposition 3 An industry is more dependent on external ﬁnance if the entrepreneur’s
21entry cost is higher, or if the entrepreneur’s private beneﬁt per unit of capital
managed is lower.
A key assumption in Rajan and Zingales (1998) is that the external dependence
in sector i, φi(r,bi,f i), is the same across countries (measured by U.S. data). This
assumption can be examined here. The functional form of φi(r,bi,f i) is indeed
the same across countries. However, in order for the value of φi(r,bi,f i) to be the
same, one must assume that the ﬁnancial interest rate r, the private beneﬁt bi and
the entry cost fi are the same across countries. Within a country, the diﬀerence
in entry cost across sectors generates diﬀerences in actual use of external ﬁnance.
Across countries, the diﬀerence in the quality of corporate governance generates
diﬀerences in actual use of external ﬁnance even for the same sector. Of course,
with cross-country variations in bi,f i, and r, the realized dependence on external
ﬁnance in sector i, φi(r,bi,f i), is country-speciﬁci ng e n e r a l .
4.2 The Relative Size of Financial Markets - A Common Measure
of Financial Development
In the empirical literature, a country’s ﬁnancial development is often represented by
the size of a ﬁnancial market (e.g., Rajan and Zingales 1998, La Porta et al. 1997
and 1998). Theoretical studies on the determinants of the size of ﬁnancial markets
are limited. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) show that as investor protection becomes
stronger, the ﬁnancial markets becomes larger. Rajan and Zingales (2003) propose
an interest group theory to explain the evolution of ﬁnancial market.
In our model, the size of a ﬁnancial market (the ratio of total external ﬁnance
to GDP) is determined by intermediation cost c, agency cost b, level of property
rights protection λ, and capital-labor ratio κ. We can show that with high-quality
institutions, an improvement in the quality of ﬁnancial system increases total external
ﬁnance, but leaves GDP unchanged, thereby increasing the relative size of the
ﬁnancial market. However, an increase in capital-labor ratio κ reduces the ﬁnancial
22interest rate and depresses the incentive for capitalists to supply external ﬁnance,
thereby reducing the relative size of the ﬁnancial market. In an economy with
low-quality institutions, on the other hand, an improvement in the quality of ﬁnancial
system increases total external ﬁnance, but not by as much as it increases GDP,
thereby resulting in a smaller relative size of the ﬁnancial market. These opposite
eﬀects provide a possibly non-monotonic relationship between income level and the
relative size of the ﬁnancial markets, which is consistent with the evidence presented
by Rajan and Zingales (2003), without appealing to a political economy story. We
now move to a formal analysis.
As each capitalist owns one unit of capital, the total external ﬁnance in the
economy is equal to the number of active ﬁnancial investors. Recall that Ni is the
number of entrepreneurs in sectors i. The capital endowment constraint (18) can
be rewritten as
(a1KY1 − N1)+( a2KY2 − N2)=Kmax − N1 − N2 ⇔ (27)
φ1a1KY1 + φ2a2KY2 = KX (28)
The right hand side of (28), KX = Kmax − N1 − N2, is the total supply of external
ﬁnance, while each component of the left hand side, aiKYi − Ni =( ki − 1)Ni =
φiKi = φiaiKYi, represents the demand for external fund in sector i.
Equation (28) highlights two channels in determining total external ﬁnance:a n
interest rate channel and a relative output channel. First, a change in φi(r,b,fi)
aﬀects KX. When the ﬁnancial interest rate is higher, more capitalists choose to
become ﬁnancial investors rather than entrepreneurs. Therefore, φi(r,b,fi) is higher
as indicated by equation (26) so that KX becomes larger. That is denoted as the
interest rate channel. A reduction in either intermediation cost c or agency cost
b, or a strengthening of property rights protection (i.e. a rise in ) would raise the
ﬁnancial interest rate r. As a result, realized external ﬁnance φi(r,b,fi) rises in
23every sector and therefore total external ﬁnance KX also rises.
Second, a change in output (Y1,Y 2) aﬀects KX. Recall that kX
i and li are external
ﬁnance and labor employed by the ﬁrm in sector i, respectively. We deﬁne sector i














(i,j =1 ,2). (29)
Since φ2 >φ 1 and a1 >a 2, it must be the case that φ2/a2 >φ 1/a1. That is, the
capital intensive sector is more external ﬁnance intensive. It is easy to show that
an increase in relative output Y1
Y2 raises total external ﬁnance KX. That is referred
to as the relative output channel.











where Y denotes GDP. As we will show next, the comparative statics involving
Ω diﬀers between the case of high-quality institutions and that of the low-quality
institutions, sometimes with opposite signs.
4.2.1 The Size of Financial Market with High-quality Institutions
We ﬁrst consider the comparative statics with high-quality institutions. Proposition
1 shows that a reduction in c increases the ﬁnancial interest rate, and therefore
increases KX, but leaves Y unaﬀected. This results in a higher Ω. A reduction in
b raises φi(r,bi,f i) by equation (26). It also increases the ﬁnancial interest rate,
and again increases φi(r,bi,f i). Since a reduction in b unambiguously raises KX,
while leaves Y unaﬀected, it also results in a higher Ω. The eﬀect of an increase
in λ is somewhat diﬀerent. First, through the relative output channel,i ti n c r e a s e s
KX and Y proportionally, which has no eﬀect on Ω. Second, through the interest
rate channel, it increases the ﬁnancial interest rate and therefore increase KX,w h i l e
24leaves Y unaﬀected. The net eﬀect is a higher Ω. To summarize, an improvement
in any of the three institutional parameters would lead to a bigger ﬁnancial market
relative to GDP (i.e., a higher Ω).
We now consider the eﬀect of an increase in capital to labor ratio, κ. By the
Rybczynski Theorem, this increases the output of the good that uses more external
ﬁnance, Y2, but reduces the output of the other good, Y1. By a change in the
composition of the output (the relative output channel), this raises KX. On the
other hand, an increase in κ (or an increase in K while holding L ﬁxed) raises GDP
Y, t o o .A tt h es a m et i m e ,h o w e v e r ,t h ei n c r e a s ei nκ reduces the ﬁnancial interest
rate r. Through the interest rate channel, it reduces KX. In general, the eﬀect of
an increase in κ on Ω is ambiguous. We formally prove in the Appendix that as
long as the relative demand for the good less intensive in external ﬁnance, D(p), is
inelastic, an increase in κ reduces Ω. From equation (30), we can see that a change
i nt h er e l a t i v ep r i c ep aﬀects Y but not KX. When D(p) is inelastic, the decline in
relative output Y1/Y2 raises p signiﬁcantly. Thus, an increase in κ increases Y more
than KX. Note that the assumption that D(p) is inelastic is plausible if the good
less intensive in external ﬁnance is a composite of necessary goods.
4.2.2 The Size of Financial Market with Low-quality Institutions
In an economy with low-quality institutions, an increase in κ has no eﬀect on either
KX, Y (Proposition 2), or Ω. When the quality of institution improves, on the other
hand, both KX and Y change. First, through the interest rate channel, a reduction
in the agency cost raises φi(0,b,f i) and therefore increases KX. A reduction in
t h ec o s to fﬁnancial intermediation or an improvement in property rights protection
has no eﬀect on φi(0,b,f i). Second, an improvement in any institutional parameter
increases the maximum amount of capital employed in the economy, κmax(c,b,λ),
w h i c hi nt u r ni n c r e a s e sb o t hKX through the relative output channel and GDP Y
as well. The eﬀect on Ω thus is ambiguous. We prove in the Appendix that if the
25relative demand, D(p), is inelastic, an improvement in any institutional parameter
increases Y more than it does KX, thereby reducing Ω. This discussion can be
summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Suppose that the relative demand for the good less intensive in
external ﬁnance is inelastic. a) An improvement in the quality of institutions increases
t h es i z eo ft h eﬁnancial market in an economy with high-quality institutions, but
reduces it in an economy with low-quality institutions. b) An increase in capital
endowment, on the other hand, reduces the size of the ﬁnancial market in an economy
with high-quality institutions, but has no eﬀect with low-quality institutions. c) An
improvement in the quality of institutions has no eﬀect on GDP in an economy with
high-quality institutions, but increases GDP with low-quality institutions. d) On the
other hand, an increase in the capital endowment increases GDP in an economy with
high-quality institutions, but has no eﬀect on the GDP with low-quality institutions.
A visual representation of the comparative statics is described in Figure 4, where
vertical axis represents the size of the ﬁnancial market Ω, and the horizontal axis
represents the quality of ﬁnancial intermediation 1/c, respectively. Given b = b0
and λ = λ0, c represents the threshold that separates economies with high-quality
institutions (1/c > 1/c) from the ones with low-quality institutions (1/c ≤ 1/c).
When 1/c ≤ 1/c, the economy is in the range of low-quality institutions. For
comparison, the eﬀect on Y is also depicted. Figure 5 depicts the eﬀect of an
increase in capital-labor ratio κ, with the horizontal axis representing κ. When
κ<κ max, the economy is in the range of high-quality institutions; an increase in κ
reduces Ω. When κ ≥ κmax, an increase in κ has no eﬀect on Ω.
Rajan and Zingales (2003) report an intriguing (and somewhat surprising) pattern
i nt h ed a t a : t h er e l a t i v es i z eo fﬁnancial markets in the United States and most
other countries was lower in 1980 than in 1913, and only in more recent years does
it tend to surpass the 1913 value. The apparent non-monotonic relationship between
26income (or institutional development) and the relative size of ﬁnancial markets can
be rationalized by our model. The relative size of ﬁnancial market is a function of
the capital-labor ratio and of institutional parameters. That is,

















Take the United States as an example of an economy with high-quality institutions.
Over the last century both its capital-labor ratio, κ, and its quality of institutions
(1/c,1/b,λ) have been improving. Using Proposition 4, the ﬁrst term (the endowment
eﬀect) in the right hand side of (31) is negative, while the second term (the institutional
eﬀect) is positive. If from 1913 to 1980, the endowment eﬀect dominated the
institutional eﬀect, then it would not be surprising, according to our model, that the
relative size of the ﬁnancial market in the U.S. actually declined. This is plausible if
regulatory measures such as the Glass-Steagall Act (restricting cross-state banking
and universal banking) and Regulation Q (imposing a ceiling on bank interest
rates) may have increased the cost of ﬁnancial intermediation. If, since the 1980s,
the institutional eﬀect began to dominate the endowment eﬀect, perhaps through
ﬁnancial deregulation, then the relative size of the ﬁnancial market may exhibit a
revival. Of course, our model is only suggestive. To truly explain the evolution
of ﬁnancial development over a century, we need to extend this static model to a
dynamic one, which is left for future research.
4.2.3 The Size of Financial Market and Production Structure
With low-quality institutions, Proposition 2 points out that the country with a
better ﬁnancial system (a lower c or b) produces more goods in the external ﬁnance
intensive sector (sector 2). The most common proxy for ﬁnancial development
in the empirical literature—the ratio of total external ﬁnance to GDP, Ω,—may be
27misleading. As indicated by Figure 4 and Proposition 4, when ﬁnancial intermediation
improves, Ω declines even though the country produces more of the external ﬁnance
intensive good. Thus, the ratio of total external ﬁnance to GDP and the relative
output of external ﬁnance intensive good could be negatively correlated.
For an economy with high-quality institutions, Proposition 1 shows a lack of
monotonic mapping between the quality of ﬁnancial systems and production structure.
However, as the capital to labor ratio increases, the relative size of a ﬁnancial market
can also be negatively correlated with the relative output of the external ﬁnance
intensive good.
In summary, we recognize the endogenous nature of the relative size of ﬁnancial
markets, and show that its relationship with deep parameters representing the cost
of ﬁnancial intermediation or the quality of corporate governance is not monotonic.
The common empirical measure that uses the relative size of ﬁnancial markets as a
proxy for the level of ﬁnancial development may be unreliable.
5 Free Trade and Capital Flows
Using the comparative statics derived above, we are now ready to study the consequences
of free trade in goods and of international capital ﬂows. Consider two countries
with identical and homothetic tastes and identical technologies, but with diﬀerent
endowments and diﬀerent ﬁnancial systems. To simplify the analysis, we assume
that the extent of property rights protection, λ, and entrepreneurs’ entry costs fi,
are the same in the two countries. Labor is immobile across countries by assumption.
To organize our discussion, we start with the case of free trade in goods without
international capital ﬂows. We then discuss the case with international capital ﬂows.
285.1 Free Trade
Let two countries, “South” and “North”, be open to free trade. In the case when
both South and North have high-quality institutions, the trade pattern and welfare
eﬀect of moving from autarky to free trade are identical to the Heckscher-Ohlin case:
the country will export the good using its abundant factor intensively and import
the other good; free trade enhances welfare for both countries. We therefore choose
to focus on a more interesting (and less familiar) case in which South has low-quality
institutions and North has high-quality institutions.
5.1.1 Trade Pattern and Relative Size of Financial Market
We use superscripts (S,N) to denote countries, and a and f to denote autarky and
free trade, respectively. Let pSa and pNa be relative prices of good 1 in South and
North under autarky, respectively. The pattern of trade is determined by comparing
pSa and pNa. We assume that South is both poorer in capital endowment (i.e.













2 = κmax(cS,b S) (33)
where κmax(cS,b S) is the maximum amount of capital employed per capita in South
and is less than the capital endowment per capita, κS = KS
LS , since South is institutionally
binding. Thus, κmax(cS,b S) ≤ κS <κ N. Comparing equations (32) and (33) in
South and (17) and (18) in North and using the Rybczynski theorem, we immediately




2 so that pSa <p Na.
Let pf b et h ep r i c ea f t e rf r e et r a d e .I tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tpSa ≤ pf ≤ pNa.
Compared with autarky, therefore, South produces more of the labor intensive good
and exports it, and imports the capital intensive good. Since free trade raises
29the relative price of the labor intensive good in South, by the Stopler-Samuelson
theorem, the gross interest rate in South would decline. Therefore, the ﬁnancial
interest rate in South is still stuck at zero, and South must remain institutionally
binding after free trade. On the other hand, free trade raises North’s gross interest
rate so it remains endowment- binding. The factor endowment constraints in North,
(17) and (18), do not change, which implies that the equilibrium output remains




T h ef r e et r a d ep r i c epf must be equal to the autarky price in South, pSa, if South
is diversiﬁed. To see this, note that since the gross interest rate is stuck at c,a s
equation (25) indicates, the wage rate in South under free trade remains unchanged.
If pf >p Sa, the proﬁt in sector 1 would be positive and factors would ﬂow from
sector 2 to 1, so pf would decline. Therefore in free trade equilibrium we must have






















































2 = κSf (36)
It is straightforward to show that the South produces more of the labor intensive







2 . It is then easy to show that κSf <κ max(cS,b S). That is,
South uses less capital in free trade than in autarky. The boundary condition for









where z1 = LS/a1L is the maximum amount of good 1 that South could produce.
Note that the output in North is a function of its labor endowment and the capital-labor









, by which South remains diversiﬁed in free trade. If LN >L ∗N,
or κN >κ ∗N, South must completely specialize in producing good 1. In that case,
the total amount of capital employed in South is ﬁxed at κSf = LS/a1.
Suppose that South remains diversiﬁed. Free trade increases the relative size of




so the GDP (in units of good 2) in North declines, while its ﬁnancial interest rate and
therefore the amount of its total external ﬁnance increase. With these two eﬀects,
the ratio of total external ﬁnance to GDP in North must increase. The eﬀect on
South is mixed. On one hand, as South produces less of the good that is relatively
intensive in external ﬁnance (the capital intensive good) after free trade, its total
external ﬁnance declines. On the other hand, as will be shown below, its GDP also
declines. As a result, the ratio of the two may either increase or decrease.
5.1.2 Aggregate Income
Assume that total cost of ﬁnancial intermediation, cKmax, and all entry costs paid
by entrepreneurs, (1 + r)(f1N1 + f2N2), are distributed to labor. The aggregate
income, W, is the sum of expected labor income, entrepreneurs’ net income, and
investors’ net income. Note that the income for a typical entrepreneur (net of entry
cost), and that for a typical active ﬁnancial investor are both equal to 1+r. K−Kmax
of capitalists do not invest (and eat their capital at the end of period 2). The total
31investment, Kmax = K1 + K2. Combining these results, we have:
W =[ λwL + cKmax +( 1+r)f1N1 +( 1+r)f2N2]+( 1+r)Kmax +( K − Kmax)















i . Using this result, expression (38) can be written as
W = K + λwL +( r + c)Kmax + b
avg





Since South is institutionally binding, its aggregate income is
WSt = KS + λwStLS + cKSt + b
avg






for t = a in autarky and f in free trade, respectively. Expression (40) highlights a
possible income loss in South due to free trade. As discussed earlier, wSa = wSf as
long as South remains diversiﬁed. KSa = Kmax >K Sf since the South produces










1 and the capital
usage in sector 2 is smaller under free trade than in autarky. Free trade, by reducing
both the total capital usage and the pay to entrepreneurs, without changing the wage
rate, must reduce the aggregate income in South. If South completely specializes in
producing good 1 under free trade, the wage rate may go up, and hence make up
for some of the lost capital income.
325.1.3 Welfare
Using (13), the aggregate income (38) can also be written as the sum of the capital
endowment and GDP
W = K + λ[pF1(L1,K 1)+F2(L2,K 2)] (41)
As capital endowment K is exogenous, the decrease in aggregate income W implies a
decrease in GDP. Let the utility function for a representative consumer be u(c1,c 2).
The indirect utility function becomes
V (p,L,K)=m a x
c1,c2
{u(c1,c 2):pc1 + c2 ≤ W} (42)
Note that K1 + K2 = Kmax. Diﬀerentiating V (p,L,K) with respect to p and
using the envelope theorem,7 we obtain
∂V(p,L,K)
∂p






where μ is the marginal utility of income.




1 > 0 in South since it exports good 1. Thus the ﬁrst
term captures the traditional gain from trade. The second term, however, represents





1 < 0 in North and the second term vanishes since Kmax = KN, which
implies that North always gains from free trade. Summarizing we have:
Proposition 5 (1) South (with low-quality institutions) exports a labor intensive
good and imports a capital intensive good. (2) If South remains diversiﬁed, free
trade increases North’s size of the ﬁnancial market. (3) While North always gains
from free trade, South exhibits a decline in aggregate income (and potentially welfare)










33if it remains diversiﬁed.
5.2 Capital Flows
We consider two types of international capital ﬂows. Financial capital is assumed to
go where the ﬁnancial interest rate is the highest; it occurs when a ﬁnancial investor
decides to take her endowment out of the country and places it in a foreign ﬁnancial
system. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is assumed to go where the expected return
to physical capital is the highest; it takes place when an entrepreneur decides to take
her project to a foreign country and combine the capital under her management
with foreign labor in the production. We ﬁrst study ﬁnancial capital movement by
assuming FDI is disallowed. We then go on to allow both types of capital ﬂows.
5.2.1 Financial Capital Flow
Suppose South is diversiﬁed after free trade. The gross interest rate in South is
equal to its cost of ﬁnancial intermediation, gS = cS, while the gross interest rate in
North, gN = rN +cN, is determined by equations (15) and (16). Since rS =0<r N,
ﬁnancial capital must ﬂow from South to North. As long as South is diversiﬁed,
the ﬁnancial interest rate in South remains at zero. This means ﬁnancial capital
will keep leaving South until it becomes completely specialized in producing the
labor intensive good. If capital continues to ﬂow from South to North after that,
South produces less of the labor intensive good; North produces more of the capital
intensive good and less labor intensive good. So the world relative price of good 1,
p, increases, reducing rN in North in accord with the Stopler-Samuelson theorem.
The ﬁnancial interest rate in South rS, however, increases as p increases, and is
determined by equation (24) which we rewrite as follows:
¡
cS + rS¢




34In equilibrium we must have rS = rN. Equation (44) then solves for the wage rate
wS. The following proposition summarizes our discussion:
Proposition 6 Allowing ﬁnancial capital ﬂow (but disallowing FDI), ﬁnancial capital
tends to ﬂow from South to North. As a result, South must completely specialize in
producing the labor intensive good.
5.2.2 Two-Way Capital Flows and the Bypass Eﬀect
We now allow for both types of capital ﬂow. We assume that the entrepreneur who
takes her project to a foreign country still uses her home ﬁnancial system to obtain
external ﬁnance. In other words, if a U.S. multinational ﬁrm operates in India, the
ﬁrm still uses a US bank or stock market for its ﬁnancing needs. Note that South
specializes in producing good 1 due to ﬁnancial capital ﬂow, so FDI takes place in
sector 1 initially. When a Northern entrepreneur in sector 1 directly engages in FDI






(rN + cN)+bN − λSRS
1
(45)
The entrepreneur engages in FDI in South if and only if UNd
1 >U N
1 , which holds in
turn if and only if λSRS
1 >λ NRN
1 .
Rewriting condition (13) in both countries, we have:
λSRS
1 =( rS + cS)+b
avg,S
1 = rS + ρS
1 (46)
λNRN
1 =( rN + cN)+b
avg,N
















i(i =1 ,2;j = S,N) is the sum of the ﬁnancial intermediation cost and the average
net pay to an entrepreneur in sector i.S i n c erS = rN due to ﬁnancial capital ﬂow,
we must have λSRS
1 >λ NRN
1 . Therefore, FDI ﬂows from North to South.
35South sends out ﬁnancial capital to escape the low ﬁnancial interest rate at
home, and at the same time, receives inward FDI due to higher domestic return to
physical capital. As ﬁnancial capital ﬂows from South to North, South produces
less of the labor intensive good and North produces more of the capital intensive
good. So p increases, which reduces rN in North by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
and increases rS because of a complete specialization in South. As a result, λNRN
1
decreases but λSRS
1 increases, driving more FDI ﬂowing from North into South. On
the other hand, as FDI ﬂows into South, North produces less of the capital intensive
good and South produces more of the labor intensive good. So p decreases, which
increases rN and reduces rS, w h i c hi nt u r nd r i v e sm o r eﬁnancial capital to ﬂow from
South to North. In summary, ﬁnancial capital and FDI tend to move in the opposite
directions and reinforce each other. So in equilibrium all ﬁnancial capital owned by
South leaves the country in the form of ﬁnancial capital outﬂow, and reenters in the
form of FDI. The equilibrium can be summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Allowing both for FDI and ﬁnancial capital ﬂow, the unique equilibrium
features a complete bypass: all capital endowment in South leaves the country in the
form of ﬁnancial capital outﬂow, and all physical investment in South takes place
through FDI; the low quality ﬁnancial institutions in South are completely bypassed.
The above proposition is a two-sector generalization of Ju and Wei (2007).
Welfare eﬀects of capital ﬂows in South are mixed. First, the world output of
capital intensive good increases when ﬁnancial capital ﬂows from South to North,
which improves terms of trade in South. Second, investors in South earn higher
interest rate. Both eﬀects beneﬁt South. On the other hand, the bypassing of the
ineﬃcient ﬁnancial system transfers the revenue of South’s ﬁnancial intermediation
and management from South to North. The welfare impact on South, therefore, is
determined by a trade-oﬀ between an eﬃciency gain from capital mobility and a
revenue loss in ﬁnancial intermediation and entrepreneurial pay.
366C o n c l u s i o n
While dominant trade theories and leading textbooks on trade ignore the role of
ﬁnance in determining production and trade patterns, recent empirical literature
based in ﬁnancial economics (pioneered by Rajan and Zingales, 1998) has recognized
a possibly prominent role for ﬁnancial development in determining patterns of trade.
However, whether the role of ﬁnance is a reﬂection of underlying factor endowment
or an independent source of comparative advantage has not been clearly worked
out in theory. This paper provides a uniﬁed general equilibrium model in which
both the quality of a ﬁnancial system and the underlying factor endowment jointly
determine patterns of production and trade.
Our model does more than merely suggest that ﬁnance and the real economy
aﬀect each other; it yields dichotomous economic equilibria. On one hand, for
economies with low-quality institutions (relative to endowment) the quality of ﬁnancial
systems plays a decisive role, and an increase in factor endowment does not alter
output or trade patterns. On the other hand, for economies with high-quality
institutions, factor endowment plays the customary role in determining output and
trade patterns, just as in a textbook version of the HOS model; additionally, a
further reduction in the cost of ﬁnancial intermediation does not alter output and
trade patterns (although it raises ﬁnancial return to ﬁnancial investors).
In terms of modeling innovations, we adapt a standard partial equilibrium corporate
ﬁnance model from Holmstrong and Tirole (1997) to a multi-sector, general equilibrium
model. This framework allows us to endogenize both ﬁrm-level dependence on
external ﬁnance, and a measure of economy-wide ﬁnancial development (the size of
a ﬁnancial market relative to GDP). An interesting implication of our formulation
is that the deep parameters of a country’s ﬁnancial system eﬃciency or corporate
governance do not have a simple, monotonic relationship with the conventional
measure of a country’s level of ﬁnancial development or income level. Indeed, it
37is possible for an economy’s ﬁnancial development to experience a “great reversal”
(Rajan and Zingales, 2003) as it gets richer or as its institutions improve.
This is a static model in the tradition of the classic Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson
theory. This analysis could be enriched considerably if recast into a dynamic setting.
For example, unemployed capital in an economy with low-quality institutions may
manifest itself in discouraged savings (in a closed economy) or in capital ﬂight (in a
ﬁnancially open economy). The cost of a dynamic setting is that some simple and
intuitive results from the HOS setup could become substantially more complicated.
We leave this extension for future research.
References
[1] Alvarez, Fernando and Robert Lucas (2005) “General Equilibrium Analysis of
the Eaton-Kortum Model of International Trade,” NBER Working Paper,
No. 11764.
[2] Antras, Pol (2003), “Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1374-1418.
[3] Antras, Pol and Ricardo J. Caballero (2007), “Trade and Capital Flows: A
Financial Frictions Perspective,” Working Paper.
[4] Antras, Pol and Elhanan Helpman (2004), “Global Sourcing,” Journal of
Political Economy, 112, 552-580.
[5] Baldwin, Richard (1989), “Exporting the Capital Markets: Comparative
Advantage and Capital Market Imperfections,” In The Convergence
of International and Domestic Markets, edited by Audretsch, D., L.
Sleuwaegen, and H. Yamawaki, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
[6] Beck, Thorsten (2002), “Financial Development and International Trade: Is
There a Link?” Journal of International Economics, 57, 107-31.
[7] Beck, Thorsten (2003), “Financial Dependence and International Trade,”
Review of International Economics 11, 296-316.
[8] Beck, Thorsten and Ross Levine (2002), “Industry Growth and Capital
Allocation: Does Having a Market- or Bank-based System Matter?” Journal
of Financial Economics, 64, 147-180.
[9] Berglof, Erik, and E. von Thadden (1994), “Short-Term versus Long-Term
Interests: Capital Structure with Multiple Investors,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 109, 1055-84.
[10] Bhagwati, Jagdish, Arvind Panagariya and T.N. Srinvasan (1998), Lectures on
International Trade,T h eM I TP r e s s .
38[11] Carlin, Wendy and Colin Mayer (2003), “Finance, Investment, and Growth,”
Journal of Financial Economics, 69, 191-226.
[12] Claessens, S. and L. Laeven (2003), “Financial Development, Property Rights,
and Growth,” Journal of Finance, 58: 2401-36.
[13] Costinot, Arnaud (2007), “Contract Enforcement, Division of Labor, and the
Pattern of Trade,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122 (2), 569-600.
[14] Davis, D. and David Weinstein (2001), “An Account of Global Factor Trade,”
American Economic Review, 91(5), 1423-1453.
[15] Davis, D. and David Weinstein (2003), “The Factor Content of Trade,” in
Kwan Choi and James Harrigan, eds., Handbook of International Trade,
Basil Blackwell.
[16] Diamond, Douglas (1991), “Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 709-37.
[17] Do, Quy-Toan and Andrei Levchenko (2007), “Comparative Advantage,
Demand for External Finance, and Financial Development,” Journal of
Financial Economics, 86:3, 796—834.
[18] Dixit, A.K. and V. Norman (1980), Theory of International Trade, Cambridge
University Press.
[19] Eaton, Jonathan and Samuel Kortum (2002), “Technology, Geography, and
Trade,” Econometrica, 70(5), 1741-1779.
[20] Feenstra, Robert (2004), Advanced International Trade, Princeton University
Press.
[21] Fisman, Raymond and Inessa Love (2004), “Financial Development and Growth
in the Short and Long Run,” NBER Working Paper 10236.
[22] Goldsmith, R. W. (1969), Financial Structure and Development,N e wH a v e n ,
CT: Yale University Press.
[23] Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1998), “Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic
M o d e lo fD e b t , ”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(1), 1-41.
[24] Holmstrom, Bengt and Jean Tirole (1997), “Financial Intermediation, Loanable
Funds, and the Real Sector,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(3),
663—691.
[25] Harrigan, James (1997), “Technology, Factor Supplies, and International
Specialization: Estimating the Neoclassical Model,” American Economic
Review, 87, 475-94.
[26] Jones, Ronald (1965), “The Structure of Simple General Equilibrium Models,”
Journal of Political Economy, 73(6), 557-72.
[27] Ju, Jiandong and Shang-Jin Wei (2005), “Endowment versus Finance: A
Wooden Barrel Theory of International Trade,” CEPR Discussion Paper
5109.
39[28] Ju, Jiandong and Shang-Jin Wei (2007), “Domestic Institutions and the Bypass
Eﬀect of Financial Globalization," NBER working paper 13148.
[29] Kletzer, Kenneth and Pranab Bardhan (1987), “Credit Market and Patterns of
International Trade,” Journal of Development Economics, 27, 57-70.
[30] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert
Vishny (1997), “Legal Determinants of External Finance,” Journal of
Finance, 52(3), 1131-50.
[31] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert
Vishny (1998), “Law and Finance,” Journal of Political Economy, 106(6),
1113-55.
[32] Levchenko, Andrei (2007), “Institutional Quality and International Trade,”
Review of Economic Studies, 74:3, 791-819.
[33] Levine, Ross (2005), “Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence,” in Philippe
Aghion and Steven Durlauf, eds. Handbook of Economic Growth,T h e
Netherlands: Elsevier Science.
[34] Lucas, R. E. (1988), “On the Mechanics of Economic Development,” Journal
of Monetary Economics, 22: 3-42.
[35] Manova, Kalina (2007), “Credit Constraints, Heterogeneous Firms, and
International Trade,” Working Paper.
[36] Manova, Kalina (2008), “Credit Constraints, Equity Market Liberalizations
and International Trade,” Working Paper.
[37] Matsuyama, Kiminori (2005), “Credit Market Imperfection and Patterns of
International Trade and Capital Flows”, Journal of the European Economic
Association, 3: 714-23.
[38] Miller, M. H. (1998), “Financial Markets and Economic Growth,” Journal of
Applied Corporate Finance, 11: 8-14.
[39] Nunn, Nathan (2005), “Relationship-Speciﬁcity, Incomplete Contracts, and the
Pattern of Trade,” mimeo.
[40] Rajan, Raghuram and Luigi Zingales (1998), “Financial Development and
Growth,” American Economic Review, 88(3), 559-586.
[41] Rajan, Raghuram and Luigi Zingales (2003), “The Great Reversals: The
Politics of Financial Development in the Twentieth Century,” Journal of
Financial Economics, 69, 5-50.
[42] Robinson, J. (1952), “The Generalization of the General Theory,” In: the Rate
of Interest and Other Essays, London: MacMillan.
[43] Romalis, John (2004), “Factor Proportions and the Structure of Commodity
Trade,” American Economic Review, 94(1), 67-97.
[44] Schumpeter, J. A. (1912), The Theory of Economic Development,t r a n s l a t e d
by R. Opie, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934.
40[45] Shleifer, Andrei, and D. Wolfenzon (2002), “Investor Protection and Equity
Markets,” Journal of Financial Economics 66, 3-27.
[46] Svaleryd, H. and J. Vlachos (2005), “Financial Markets, the Pattern of
Industrial Specialization and Comparative Advantage: Evidence from
OECD Countries,” European Economic Review 49, 113-44.
[47] Treﬂer, Daniel (1993), “International Factor Price Diﬀerences: Leontief was
Right!” Journal of Political Economy, 101(6), 961-987.
[48] Treﬂer, Daniel (1995), “The Case of the Missing Trade and Other Mysteries,”
American Economic Review, 85(5),1029-1046
[49] Wynne, J. (2005), “Wealth As a Determinant of Comparative Advantage,”
American Economic Review 95(1), 226-54.
7A p p e n d i x
1 .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :
By diﬀerentiating equations (15), (16), (17), and (18), it is straightforward to
prove the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the Rybczynski theorem. We therefore
show only the eﬀects of a change in the institutional parameters. Solving equations































R1 = pF1(.) − wa1 > 0 (50)
Substituting (48) into (50), we have
R1 > 0 ⇒ a1F2(.) − a2pF1(.) > 0 (51)
Noting that f2 >f 1,a 1 >a 2, and that increasing λ does not change p, we have
dw
db > 0, dw
dλ < 0,
dg
db < 0, and
dg
dλ > 0. This proves Proposition 1.
2. Proof of Proposition 2:
































Applying (51) to (53), we obtain that dw
dc < 0, dw
db < 0, and dw




db < 0, and
dp
dλ > 0.


















dp < 0 and dz2
dp > 0. A reduction in c or b, or an increase in λ, all raises
p, w h i c hi nt u r nr e d u c e sz1 but increases z2.
Finally let us consider the eﬀect on κmax (c,b,λ). Given z1 and z2,κ max (c,b,λ)










Thus, dκmax > 0 since dz1 < 0.
3. Proof of Proposition 4:
We ﬁrst consider an institutionally binding economy. Using (30) and noting that





















dc > 0, dz2
dc < 0, and
dp
dc < 0 as we have proved in Proposition 2, dΩ
dc > 0









































dc < 0 and the elasticity of relative demand,
D0(p)P
D(p) , is negative. Thus,
dΩ
dc > 0 if
D0(p)P
D(p) > −1. Similarly we can show that dΩ
db > 0 and dΩ
dλ > 0.






















dc < 0 if
D0(p)P
D(p) > −1.













































































dκ < 0, so dΩ
dκ < 0 if
D0(p)P
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